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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Michael Francis Moore appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty 
plea to burglary. On appeal, Moore argues the district court erred by denying his 
request for a mental health evaluation. He also argues the district court abused 
its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Moore entered a Rite-Aid store, took a six-pack of Mike's Hard Lemonade 
from the shelf, concealed it under his shirt, and attempted to leave the store 
without paying for the merchandise. (PSI, pp.2, 35.) When a loss prevention 
officer stopped him, Moore punched her in the face and fled the store. (PSI, 
pp.2, 35.) 
The state charged Moore with burglary, petit theft and battery. (R., pp.24-
25.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Moore pied guilty to burglary and the state 
dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.39-48.) Moore failed to appear for his 
first scheduled sentencing hearing, and the court issued a bench warrant for his 
arrest. (R., pp.48-50.) After he was arrested on the warrant, Moore requested 
and received two additional continuances of the sentencing hearing to allow him 
review the PSI. (3/16/10 Tr., p.5, L.14 - p.6, L.23; 3/23/10 Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.10, 
L.22, p.12, L.4 - p.14, L.11.) 
At the hearing where Moore requested a second continuance of his 
sentencing hearing, Moore also requested a mental health evaluation pursuant 
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to I.C. § 19-2524. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16.) Specifically, Moore's attorney 
advised the court: 
[l]t's come to my attention that at the time of this incident, Mr. 
Moore was experiencing hallucinations, symptoms of his 
schizophrenia. He is also bipolar and is not on his medication. 
And it has come to my attention that his mental health issues 
probably played a very big role in this incident. 
I know the Court and the State is [sic] not in support of his 
mental health court screening, and I think it's also because the 
crime is burglary, and they probably won't accept him because of 
that. But I think it would be a beneficial - if he had a 19-2524 
mental health evaluation, I think that information would be 
beneficial to this Court prior to his sentencing. 
(3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16.) The state inquired about the utility of ordering an 
I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation, noting that Moore's schizophrenia was 
"documented in the materials" already available to the court, and stating, "I just 
don't know what [an evaluation is] going to tell us that we don't already know with 
regards to his mental health issues." (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.11, L.7.) The 
court agreed that Moore's mental health issues were well documented in the 
materials already before it, explaining: 
Well, a pure evaluation - I have the benefit of the report 
from lntermountain hospital of February 28th of '05, the discharge, 
which lays out the diagnosis on Axis I with schizoaffective disorder 
with alcohol and polysubstance abuse, along with some other 
things. 
And then we have a psychiatric evaluation that was done by 
Saint Alphonsus ... in August of '08. There is a - it doesn't read 
the same, necessarily, as a court-ordered evaluation, but I think it 
tells me what I'm going to find out from a court-ordered evaluation, 
that the defendant does have [a] history of schizophrenic-type 
mental illness. 
So I'm not inclined to continue this for mental health - I 
mean, the records go back ... clear to 2002. I'm looking at one in 
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January of '04 where he presents at the emergency department 
with histories of hearing voices and definitely psychotic state. 
(3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.12, L.2.) The court thus declined Moore's request for 
an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation. (3/23/10 Tr., p.12, L.3.) 
At the final continued sentencing hearing on March 30, 2010, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed. (3/30/10 Tr., 
p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.17; R., pp.59-64, 72-75.) Moore filed a timely Rule 35 
motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.70-
71, 78-83, 86-89.) Moore timely appealed. (R., pp.90-95.) 
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ISSUES 
Moore states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Moore's motion 
for a mental health evaluation? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Moore's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of 
Sentence in light of the new information offered by Mr. 
Moore? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. At his third scheduled sentencing hearing, Moore requested the court to 
order an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation, and the district court 
denied that request. For the first time on appeal, Moore argues the district 
court erred by not ordering an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation. 
Must this Court decline to consider Moore's appellate argument - that the 
district court erred by declining to order an evaluation he never requested 
- because it was not preserved below and is not reviewable as 
fundamental error? 
2. Has Moore failed to show the district court abused its discretion in denying 




Moore's Claim That The District Court Erred By Not Ordering An I.C. § 19-2522 
Psychological Evaluation Never Requested By Moore Below Is Not Properly 
Before This Court For The First Time On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
At the third scheduled sentencing hearing in this case, Moore's attorney 
advised the court that Moore was experiencing symptoms of his previously 
diagnosed mental illnesses when he committed the crimes in this case, and she 
suggested that "a 19-2524 mental health evaluation" might be "beneficial to [the] 
Court prior to [Moore's] sentencing." (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16.) The district 
court denied the request, finding a further continuance of the sentencing hearing 
for the purpose of ordering the requested mental health evaluation unwarranted 
because Moore's "history of schizophrenic-type mental illness" was already well 
documented in the existing sentencing materials. 1 (3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.12, 
L.3.) 
On appeal, Moore does not challenge the district court's decision to deny 
his request for a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524. Instead he 
argues, for the first time on appeal, that the court should have ordered a 
psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) 
This Court must decline to consider the merits of Moore's appellate argument 
because Moore never requested an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation below, and his 
1 The court did, however, grant Moore an additional one-week continuance to 
enable him to fully review the PSI. (3/23/10 Tr., p.12, L.4 - p.14, L.11.) 
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unpreserved claim that the district court erred by not ordering such an evaluation 
is not reviewable as fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 
209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010). 
C. Moore's Claim That The District Court Erred By Not Ordering An I.C. § 19-
2522 Psychological Evaluation Is Unpreserved And Not Reviewable As 
Fundamental Error 
It is well-settled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 
896,894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995)); accord State v. Carter, 115 Idaho 170, _, 307 
P.3d 187, 190 (2013). An exception to this rule exists if the alleged error 
constitutes fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976; Carter, 
155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 190. However, the burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error rests squarely with the defendant asserting the error for the 
first time on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P .3d at 980; Carter, 155 Idaho 
at , 307 P.3d at 190. To carry that burden, a defendant asserting an 
unpreserved error must demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or 
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more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need 
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 
was not harmless." Perry. 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980, quoted in Carter, 
155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 190. Because a claim that a trial court erred by 
failing to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation in compliance with I.C. § 
19-2522 asserts a statutory violation, not a constitutional violation, it fails to 
satisfy even the threshold requirement of Perry and is not reviewable as 
fundamental error. State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, _, 311 P.3d 283, 285 
(2013); Carter, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 191. 
Citing exclusively to the standards applicable to a district court's decision 
to order a psychological evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522, Moore argues 
"the district court erred when it denied [his] request and refused to order a mental 
health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) 
Moore apparently believes he preserved this issue for appeal because he also 
represents that defense counsel below "requested a mental health evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522." (Appellant's brief, p.8 (citing 3/23/10 Tr., p.10, 
Ls.13-16).) Moore is clearly mistaken. A review of the cited transcript shows 
defense counsel below actually requested "a 19-2524 mental health evaluation" 
(3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-16 (emphasis added)), not an I.C. § 19-2522 
psychological evaluation as Moore contends on appeal. Because Moore never 
requested an l.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation below, his claim on appeal 
that the district erred by not ordering such an evaluation is not preserved and this 
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Court must decline to consider it. Clinton, 155 Idaho at _, 311 P .3d at 285; 
Carter, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d at 191. 
To the extent Moore believes there is no meaningful distinction between a 
mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 and a psychological 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522 - such that a request for one preserves a 
claim of error as to a failure to order the other - he is incorrect. At the time of 
Moore's sentencing, I. C. § 19-2524 provided, in part: 
Substance abuse and mental health treatment. - (1) 
When a defendant has pied guilty to or been found guilty of a 
felony, or when a defendant who has been convicted of a felony 
has admitted to or been found to have committed a violation of a 
condition of probation, the court, prior to the sentencing hearing or 
the hearing on revocation of probation, may order the defendant to 
undergo a substance abuse assessment and/or a mental health 
examination. 
I.C. § 19-2524(1) (2010).2 Idaho Code§ 19-2522, on the other hand, provides: 
Examination of defendant for evidence of mental 
condition - Appointment of psychiatrists or licensed 
psychologists - Hospitalization - Reports. - (1) If there is 
reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a 
significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the 
court shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed 
psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of 
the defendant. ... 
I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). The obvious overriding purpose of both statutes is to assist 
the sentencing court "in determining whether to recommend psychological 
treatment ... during a defendant's confinement or probation." State v. Hanson, 
2 A 2012 amendment largely rewrote I.C. § 19-2524. See 2012 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, ch. 225, § 3, p.611. The amendment, which was effective March 1, 2013, 
has no application to this case. Therefore, all further citations to I.C. § 19-2524 
will be to the 2010 version. 
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152 Idaho 314, 323, 271 P.3d 712, 721 (2012) (citing State v. Harper, 129 Idaho 
86, 91, 922 P.2d 383, 388 (1996)); State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 732, 249 
P.3d 1184, 1187 (Ct. App. 2011) (I.C. § 19-2524 "broadens a court's sentencing 
options related to treatment for substance abuse or mental health issues"). But 
the differences between the two statutes are equally obvious, particularly as they 
relate to the legal standards applicable to a court's decision to grant or deny a 
request to order one evaluation or the other. 
Both the plain language of I.C. § 19-2522 and Idaho case law make clear 
that, when requested, a district court must order an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation if there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
be a significant factor at sentencing. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 319, 271 P.3d at 717 
(and cases cited therein, holding that language of I.C. § 19-2522(1) is mandatory 
and requires court to order a psychological evaluation when "there is reason to 
believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at 
sentencing"); Clinton, 155 Idaho at_, 311 P.3d at 285 (failure of sentencing 
court to sua sponte order an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation is not a 
fundamental error reviewable for the first time on appeal); Carter, 155 Idaho at 
_, 307 P.3d at 191 (same). The decision to grant or deny a request for an I.C. 
§ 19-2524 mental health evaluation, on the other hand, is purely discretionary. 
Hanson, 150 Idaho at 732, 249 P.3d at 1187 ("The word 'may' [in I.C. § 19-
2524(1 )] is permissive and denotes an exercise of discretion. Thus, a court 
possesses discretion to order or decline to order a mental health examination 
prior to sentencing or at disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524." (internal citation 
9 
omitted)). In other words, when faced with a request for an I.C. § 19-2524 
mental health evaluation, a sentencing court may decline such request so long 
as it (1) perceives the issue is one of discretion, (2) acts within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and 
(3) reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. Hanson, 152 Idaho at 318-19, 
271 P.3d at 716-17 (citations omitted). 
That nothing in I.C. § 19-2524 mandates a district court to order a mental 
health evaluation under any particular set of circumstances is particularly 
significant in the context of this case. Below, Moore's attorney suggested only 
that "a 19-2524 mental health evaluation" "would be beneficial to [the] Court prior 
to [Moore's] sentencing." (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-16.) In so suggesting, Moore 
asked the court to make a purely discretionary decision to order the requested 
evaluation. Moore now argues the court was required to order a psychological 
evaluation under an entirely different statute - I.C. § 19-2522 - because, he 
claims, there was reason to believe his mental condition would be a significant 
factor at sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-12.) Even assuming the truth of 
this latter assertion, Moore never requested the I.C. § 19-2522 psychological 
evaluation he now claims the district court should have ordered and, as such, 
never gave the district court the opportunity to consider the request in light of the 
legal standards applicable to that particular statute. Having failed to do so, and 
having never obtained an adverse ruling in relation to any request for an I.C. § 
19-2522 psychological evaluation, Moore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Clinton, 155 Idaho at_, 311 P.3d at 285; Carter, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P.3d 
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at 191; see also State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 537, 285 P.3d 348, 352 (Ct. 
App. 2012) (citations omitted) (appellate court "will not review a trial court's 
alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which 
forms the basis for the assignment of error"). 
In addition to the distinction between the legal standards that inform a 
court's decision to grant or deny a request for an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health 
evaluation versus an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation, the requirements 
of the two statutes are also substantively different, such that a request for an 
evaluation under one statute is not the same as a request for an evaluation 
under the other. Idaho Code § 19-2524 contains no explicit requirements for the 
qualifications of the person conducting the mental health examination (or 
substance abuse assessment) described therein. 3 Idaho Code § 19-2522, in 
contrast, specifically requires that a psychological evaluation ordered pursuant to 
that statute be conducted by a "psychiatrist or licensed psychologist." I.C. § 19-
2522(1 ). Thus, by their very language, the statutory requirements for a 
psychological evaluation under I.C. § 19-2522 are more stringent than those for 
a mental health examination under I.C. § 19-2524 - and for good reason. 
As evidenced by the title of I.C. § 19-2522, one of the express purposes 
of a psychological evaluation under that statute is to "examin[e]" the defendant 
3 Idaho Code§ 19-2524(3)(b) provides that if, after receiving the mental health 
evaluation ordered pursuant to subsection (1), the court determines additional 
information is necessary, the court may order a second evaluation "to be 
furnished by a psychiatrist, licensed physician or licensed psychologist." There 
is, however, no requirement that the person conducting the initial examination 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524(1) possess any particular qualifications. 
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"for evidence of mental condition." Id. (capitalization altered). It is manifest that 
only a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist would be qualified to conduct such an 
examination and actually render a diagnosis of mental illness and, as such, 
those are the only individuals authorized to conduct a psychological evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. As suggested by the title of I.C. § 19-2524, however, 
the aim of that statute is not necessarily to diagnose mental illness in the first 
instance, but to instead assess a defendant's need for and amenability to 
"mental health treatment." Id. See also I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a)(vii) (requiring report 
of mental health examination to include a "plan of treatment" if certain conditions 
are met), (c)(permitting court to order mental health treatment as condition of 
probation). Given the differences between both the substantive requirements of 
the statutes and the specific purposes thereof there can be no question that the 
evaluations contemplated under each statute are not interchangeable and, 
therefore, a request for one does not preserve a claim that a trial court erred by 
not ordering the other. 
While it is clear Moore's appellate attorney now believes the district court 
should have ordered an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation for use at 
sentencing, it is unsurprising that Moore's trial attorney did not request such an 
evaluation - and instead suggested the court order a mental health examination 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 - in light of the facts of this case. By the time Moore's 
trial attorney made the request for an I. C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation, 
there was no question that Moore had a long history of mental illness. In fact, as 
Moore himself recognizes on appeal, "[t]he district court had before it well over 
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100 pages of records that reflected a diagnosis of schizophrenia with delusions 
and hallucinations and which also documented depression and suicidal 
ideations." (Appellant's brief, p.10; see also PSI, pp.12, 14-15, 19, 22, 25-26, 
71-81, 93-152, 156-58, 163-97.) It is likely because the information already 
before the court made clear that Moore suffered from schizophrenia and other 
mental illnesses or defects that Moore's trial attorney did not suggest that a 
psychological evaluation needed to be conducted to look for "evidence of' a 
mental condition, see I. C. § 19-2522; instead, she represented that Moore was 
experiencing symptoms of his previously diagnosed mental illnesses and 
suggested that the information that could be gleaned from "a 19-2524 mental 
health evaluation ... would be beneficial to [the] Court." (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-
16.) Both the prosecutor and the trial court recognized Moore's history of 
schizophrenic-type illness. (3/23/10 Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.12, L.2.) Exercising the 
discretion vested to it under I.C. § 19-2524, the district court determined that a 
prolonged continuance of the sentencing hearing for purpose of obtaining the 
requested mental health evaluation was unnecessary because the existing 
sentencing materials already contained sufficient information about Moore's 
mental illnesses to enable it to make an informed sentencing decision. (3/23/10 
Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.12, L.2.) 
Again, Moore does not actually argue the court abused its discretion in 
declining to order the only evaluation he requested. Nor could he show such an 
abuse of discretion under the facts of this case. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2524(3)(a), a report of mental health examination is required to include, inter a/ia, 
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a "diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis" of the defendant's mental condition, a 
"consideration of whether treatment is available," an "analysis of the relative risks 
and benefits of treatment or nontreatment," a "consideration of the risk of danger 
the defendant poses to the public, and, under some circumstances, a "plan of 
treatment." I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a)(i-vii). Although Moore argues otherwise (albeit 
in reference to the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522) (see Appellant's brief, pp.9-
12), even a cursory review of the information already available to the court at the 
time of sentencing shows it was more than sufficient to comply with the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2524(3)(a). 
As noted by the district court at the March 23, 2010 hearing where it 
denied Moore's request for an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation, the 
sentencing materials contain a number of records relating to Moore's mental 
condition(s), including an August 2008 Psychiatric Evaluation prepared by St. 
Alphonsus Hospital, a February 2005 discharge summary from lntermountain 
Hospital, and numerous medical and institutional records, dating back to 2002.4 
(See 3/23/10 Tr., p.11, L.8 - p.12, L.2; PSI, pp.93-197.) Together, those records 
show Moore had been consistently diagnosed with schizophrenia - with reports 
of auditory hallucinations occurring since he was an adolescent - and at least 
intermittently diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder, bipolar disorder and 
4 The records pertaining to Moore's mental condition actually go back as far as 
January 1983, when Moore underwent a psychiatric evaluation while in the 
custody of the Juvenile Diagnostic Unit at State Hospital North in Orofino. (PSI, 
pp.71-79.) At that time, Moore was diagnosed as being depressed and 
undersocialized and having an "aggressive reaction to adolescence." (PSI, 
pp.74-75, 78.) 
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depression. (PSI, pp.102-03, 105-08, 110-151, 156-58, 163-95.) Those records 
also show Moore received treatment for his mental illnesses in the form of 
psychiatric hospitalizations, psychiatric counseling and prescribed medication. 
(Id.) While the records themselves do not specifically speak to the "risks and 
benefits of treatment or nontreatment" or the "risk of danger" Moore poses to the 
community, they, along with other information in the presentence materials and 
his trial counsel's own representations, do show that Moore's tendency to 
commit crimes - including the burglary of which he was convicted in this case -
are often the result of his failure to comply with prescribed medications and 
attempts to self-medicate with alcohol and illicit substances. (PSI, pp.15, 19, 93, 
95, 102-04, 108, 144-53, 163-69, 175-82; 3/23/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-7; 3/30/10 Tr., 
p.6, Ls.18-22.) In short, the materials before the court demonstrated that Moore 
had one or more diagnosed mental illnesses for which treatment in the form of 
prescribed medication was not only available, but required, both for the purpose 
of stabilizing his mental condition(s) and to reduce the risk of danger he 
presented to the community. 5 Because any evaluation ordered pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2524 would likely only have duplicated this information, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Moore's belated request for "a 19-2524 
mental health evaluation." 
5 The trial court expressly recognized this and fashioned Moore's sentence, at 
least in part, to ensure he would "get stabilized on [his] medication and get some 
structure." (3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.6; see also 3/30/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.24-
25 (instructing Moore to "[g]et on [his] meds and stay on them.").) 
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The district court had discretion to decline Moore's request for an I.C. § 
19-2524 mental health examination, and Moore does not challenge that exercise 
of discretion on appeal. That Moore now believes the court was required to 
order a psychological evaluation pursuant to I. C. § 19-2522 - an entirely different 
statute with different legal standards and substantive requirements than those 
imposed by I.C. § 19-2524 - does not show any basis for reversal. For all the 
reasons stated above, Moore's request for an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health 
evaluation was not sufficient to preserve for appeal his claim that the district 
court erred by not ordering an I.C. § 19-2522 psychological evaluation. As the 
only claim Moore raises on appeal was not preserved and does not constitute 
fundamental error, this Court must decline to review it. Clinton, 155 Idaho at 
_, 311 P .3d at 285; Carter, 155 Idaho at_, 307 P .3d at 191. 
11. 
Moore Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Rule 35 Motion For Reduction Of His Already Lenient Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Citing primarily to the same information that was available to and 
specifically considered by the court at sentencing, Moore argues the district court 
abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of the unified 
sentence of five years, with one year fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to 
burglary. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-17.) Moore, however, has failed to show his 
sentence was excessive, either as originally imposed or in light of any new 
information; he has therefore failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial 
of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 
159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
C. Moore Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Rule 35 Motion 
A motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is essentially a plea for 
leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 
Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006). To prevail on a Rule 35 motion, a 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 484-85, 272 P.3d 417, 456-57 (2012); State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). "In conducting [its] 
review of the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, [the appellate court] consider[s] 
the entire record and appl[ies] the same criteria used for determining the 
reasonableness of the original sentence." State v. Mendoza, 151 Idaho 623, 
629, 262 P.3d 266, 272 (Ct. App. 2011). Specifically, the Court considers 
whether the sentence is reasonable to achieve the protection of society or any of 
the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. State v. 
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460-61, 50 P.3d 472, 475-75 (2002). Application of 
these standards to the record in this case shows Moore has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
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Moore is a danger to society. His criminal record occupies seven pages 
of the PSI and includes two juvenile adjudications, at least 51 misdemeanor 
convictions and two prior felony convictions (both for burglary). (PSI, pp.3-9.) 
The majority of his convictions have resulted from alcohol and theft related 
offenses, as well as from crimes of violence. (PSI, pp.3-9.) He has served 
seven years in prison, has had the benefit of two periods of retained jurisdiction, 
and has been afforded numerous opportunities on probation and parole. (PSI, 
pp.3-11.) In fact, Moore was on probation for unlawful entry when he committed 
the burglary of which he was convicted in this case. (PSI, pp.9-11.) 
There is no doubt, as Moore argues on appeal, that Moore has 
experienced a number of difficulties in his life. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-15; PSI, 
pp.13-19.) He was abused by alcoholic parents, was placed in foster care, has 
at times been homeless and has lived the majority of his life addicted to alcohol 
and drugs. (PSI, pp.13-19.) The district court recognized as much, however, 
and specifically factored what it characterized as the "insurmountable obstacles" 
Moore had faced into its sentencing decision. (3/30/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25, p.12, 
Ls.11-15.) The court was also well aware that Moore was plagued by mental 
health issues, but it also noted what is apparent from the record - that Moore 
had been repeatedly treated for his mental conditions but never stayed on his 
prescribed medications, choosing instead to self-medicate with alcohol and illicit 
substances. (3/30/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-22, p.11, Ls.9-13; PSI, pp.15, 19, 93, 95, 
102-04, 108, 144-53, 163-69, 175-82.) Considering Moore's "lengthy criminal 
history" in conjunction with his mental health issues and history of drug and 
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alcohol use, the district court determined that a sentence of incarceration was 
not only warranted, but necessary to allow Moore to get stabilized on his mental 
health medication in a structured environment. (3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, 
L.15.) Although the court believed a sentence of five years fixed would be 
entirely justified given Moore's criminal record, it showed leniency by ordering 
only the first year of Moore's five-year sentence to be fixed, and it did so in 
specific recognition of the nature of the crime, Moore's background, and his need 
to get "stabilized on appropriate medicines" and be given "some tools to stay that 
way." (3/30/10 Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.20.) 
The district court imposed a lenient sentence, and one that specifically 
took into account the nature of the offense, Moore's character, and his need for 
mental health treatment. Moore nevertheless contends the court should have 
reduced his already lenient sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion because 
the documents he submitted in support of that motion showed he "has used his 
time in prison to better himself." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) As noted by the district 
court, however, the additional information Moore submitted in support of his 
motion - which consisted only of documents showing Moore had enrolled in 
rehabilitative programming while incarcerated (see R., pp.78-83) - did not show 
Moore's sentence was excessive; it only showed Moore was taking the steps 
necessary to participate in his own rehabilitation and potentially "hasten the day 
he [would be] found eligible for release from custody by the Commission [of] 
Pardons and Parole" (R., p.88). Moore's rehabilitative efforts were laudable, but 
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they did not alone justify a reduction of Moore's already lenient sentence. Moore 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
sentence and the district court's order denying Moore's Rule 35 motion. 
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